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JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(h) and § 78-2a-4 confers jurisdiction over this appeal, 
which is an appeal from an order entered by the Utah Court of Appeals. 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Whether the court of appeals erred in affirming the district court's award of an 
additional amount for alimony as each child of the Petitioner and Respondent reaches 
majority and Petitioner's obligation to pay support for each child terminates. 
Standards of Review: Alimony determinations are reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion. Griffith v. Griffith, 985 P.2d 255 (Utah 1999); Kelley v. Kelley, 9 P.3d 171 
(Utah Ct. App. 2000). 'Trial courts have considerable discretion in determining alimony 
and property distribution in divorce cases, and will be upheld on appeal unless a clear 
and prejudicial abuse of discretion is demonstrated." Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 
1211 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). In exercising its discretion, however, the trial court must 
make explicit findings of fact in support of its legal conclusions. Montoya v. Montoya, 
696 P.2d 1193, 1194 (Utah 1985). 
PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUES AND GROUNDS FOR SEEKING REVIEW 
The issue was preserved during trial (see R. 304 (trial transcript at 178-79 and 
193) and in a post-trial motion and memoranda in support of a motion for reconsideration 
of the trial court's memorandum decision (see R. at 61; 64-65 and 83-85). Tax issues 
were not raised because they did not become apparent until the Court of Appeals issued 
its decision. It is a public policy matter that should be addressed by this Court. 
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RELEVANT STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5(8), SUBSECTIONS (a), (c) and (g) (iV (if): 
(8) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; 
(iv) the length of the marriage; 
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring support; 
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated by the payor 
spouse; and 
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the payor 
spouse's skill by paying for education received by the payor spouse or allowing the payor 
spouse to attend school during the marriage. 
* * * * 
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, existing at the 
time of separation, in determining alimony in accordance with Subsection (8)(a). 
However, the court shall consider all relevant facts and equitable principles and may, in 
its discretion, base alimony on the standard of living that existed at the time of trial. 
* * * * 
(g) (i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes and new 
orders regarding alimony based on a substantial material change in circumstances not 
foreseeable at the time of the divorce. 
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for alimony to 
address needs of the recipient that did not exist at the time the decree was entered, 
unless the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify that action. 
[Emphasis added] 
UTAH CODE ANN, g 78-45-2(6) AND (7): 
(6) "Child" means: 
(a) a son or daughter under the age of 18 years who is not otherwise emancipated, 
self-supporting, married, or a member of the armed forces of the United States; 
(b) a son or daughter over the age of 18 years, while enrolled in high school during the 
normal and expected year of graduation and not otherwise emancipated, self-supporting, 
married, or a member of the armed forces of the United States; or 
(c) a son or daughter of any age who is incapacitated from earning a living and, if able 
to provide some financial resources to the family, is not able to support self by own 
means. 
(7) "Child support" means a base child support award as defined in Section 78-45-2, 
or a monthly financial award for uninsured medical expenses, ordered by a tribunal for 
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the support of a child, including current periodic payments, all arrearages which accrue 
under an order for current periodic payments, and sum certain judgments awarded for 
arrearages, medical expenses, and child care costs. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-3: 
(1) Every father shall support his child and every child shall be presumed to be in 
need of the support of his father. Every man shall support his wife when she is in need. 
(2) Except as limited in a court order under Section 30-3-5, 30-4-3, or 78-45-7.15: 
(a) The expenses incurred on behalf of a minor child for reasonable and necessary 
medical and dental expenses, and other necessities are chargeable upon the property of 
both parents, regardless of the marital status of the parents. 
(b) Either or both parents may be sued by a creditor for the expenses described in 
Subsection (2)(a) incurred on behalf of minor children. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-4: 
(1) Every woman shall support her child and every child shall be presumed to be in 
need of the support of his mother. Every woman shall support her husband when he is in 
need. 
(2) Except as limited in a court order under Section 30-3-5, 30-4-3, or 78-45-7.15: 
(a) The expenses incurred on behalf of a minor child for reasonable and necessary 
medical and dental expenses, and other necessities are chargeable upon the property of 
both parents, regardless of the marital status of the parents. 
(b) Either or both parents may be sued by a creditor for the expenses described in 
Subsection (2)(a) incurred on behalf of minor children. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-3, SUBSECTIONS (l\(3) AND (4): 
(1) In any action filed under Title 30, Chapter 3, 4, or 6, and in any action to establish 
an order of custody, parent-time, child support, alimony, or division of property in a 
domestic case, the court may order a party to pay the costs, attorney fees, and witness 
fees, including expert witness fees, of the other party to enable the other party to 
prosecute or defend the action. The order may include provision for costs of the action. 
(3) In any action listed in Subsection (1), the court may order a party to provide 
money, during the pendency of the action, for the separate support and maintenance of 
the other party and of any children in the custody of the other party. 
(4) Orders entered under this section prior to entry of the final order or judgment may 
be amended during the course of the action or in the final order or judgment. 
26 U.S.C.S. § 215 (A) AND (BV. 
(a) General Rule. In the case of an individual, there shall be allowed as a deduction 
an amount equal to the alimony or separate maintenance payments paid during such 
individual's taxable year. 
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(b) Alimony or separate maintenance payments defined. For purposes of this section, 
the term "alimony or separate maintenance payment" means any alimony or separate 
maintenance payment (as defined in section 71(b)) which is includible in the gross 
income of the recipient under section 71. 
26 U.S.C.S. g 71 (AUB) AND (C): 
(a) General rule. Gross income includes amounts received as alimony or separate 
maintenance payments. 
(b) Alimony or separate maintenance payments defined. For purposes of this section— 
(1) In general. The term "alimony or separate maintenance payment" means any 
payment in cash if— 
(A) such payment is received by (or on behalf of) a spouse under a divorce or 
separation instrument, 
(B) the divorce or separation instrument does not designate such payment as a 
payment which is not includible in gross income under this section and not allowable as a 
deduction under section 215, 
(C) in the case of an individual legally separated from his spouse under a 
decree of divorce or of separate maintenance, the payee spouse and the payor spouse are 
not members of the same household at the time such payment is made, and 
(D) there is no liability to make any such payment for any period after the 
death of the payee spouse and there is no liability to make any payment (in cash or 
property) as a substitute for such payments after the death of the payee spouse. 
(2) Divorce or separation instrument. The term "divorce or separation instrument" 
means— 
(A) a decree of divorce or separate maintenance or a written instrument 
incident to such a decree, 
(B) a written separation agreement, or 
(C) a decree (not described in subparagraph (A)) requiring a spouse to make 
payments for the support or maintenance of the other spouse. 
(c) Payments to support children. 
(1) In general. Subsection (a) shall not apply to that part of any payment 
which the terms of the divorce or separation instrument fix (in terms of an amount 
of money or a part of the payment) as a sum which is payable for the support of 
children of the payor spouse. 
(2) Treatment of certain reductions related to contingencies involving child. For 
purposes of paragraph (1), if any amount specified in the instrument will be reduced— 
(A) on the happening of a contingency specified in the instrument relating to a 
child (such as attaining a specified age, marrying, dying, leaving school, or a similar 
contingency), or 
(B) at a time which can clearly be associated with a contingency of a kind 
specified in subparagraph (A), an amount equal to the amount of such reduction will be 
treated as an amount fixed as payable for the support of children of the payor spouse. 
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(3) Special rule where payment is less than amount specified in instrument. For 
purposes of this subsection, if any payment is less than the amount specified in the 
instrument, then so much of such payment as does not exceed the sum payable for 
support shall be considered a payment for such support. 
[Emphasis added] 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE, PROCEEDINGS, AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Summary On or about August 26, 2003, Kynda Kay Richardson petitioned for a 
divorce from her husband, Kenneth Andrew Richardson, in the Third Judicial District 
Court for Salt Lake County. Among other things, Mrs. Richardson requested alimony 
and child support. 
Mrs. Richardson's custody of the parties' four minor children (Dana, Kyle, Avery, 
and Justin) was not contested, and the trial court awarded Mrs. Richardson physical 
custody. The trial court awarded $1,374 per month in child support to Mrs. Richardson, 
with Mr. Richardson's obligations terminating with respect to each child, either upon the 
child's eighteenth birthday or graduation from high school. The trial court ordered that 
Mrs. Richardson was entitled to alimony of $420 per month. The trial court further 
ordered that prospective increases in Mr. Richardson's alimony payments, in increments of 
$100 per month, should be implemented each time one of the four minor children reaches 
the age of eighteen. 
On June 6, 2006, Mr. Richardson appealed the Decree and the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law raising two issues, (1) the award of retroactive alimony, and (2) the 
prospective future increases in alimony. 
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On June 21, 2007, the Court of Appeals issued its decision, in which it affirmed the 
decision of the trial court. See Memorandum of the Utah Court of Appeals provided in the 
Addendum hereto. 
Proceedings and Factual Background Mrs. Richardson filed her Petition for 
Divorce on August 26, 2003. See R. at 1. A trial was held on February 8, 2005. After 
hearing testimony and argument, the trial court took the issues under advisement. See R. 
at 304 (trial transcript at 193). 
During trial, Mrs. Richardson testified that the parties' two oldest children had lived 
at home and attended college after reaching the age of eighteen, during which time the 
parties had supported them. See R. at 304 (transcript at 31-33). On this basis, Mrs. 
Richardson requested that the parties be required to treat the four minor children still 
domiciled with her the same way. See id. (transcript at 33). Mrs. Richardson admitted, 
however, that there was no verbal or written agreement with Mr. Richardson that the other 
children would be treated the same way. See id. (transcript at 67- 68 (beginning lines 23-
25 of page 68; ending line 15 of page 68)). 
The trial court issued a Memorandum Decision on June 3, 2005. In its 
Memorandum Decision, the trial court determined that Mr. Richardson should pay $420 
per month in alimony, for a term equal to the length of the marriage. See R. at 57. The 
trial court further determined that 
" . . . a good part of the income needed by Petitioner to maintain the 
appropriate standard of living is also attributable to child support payments 
from Respondent. * * * * . . . because the reasonable expenses associated 
for a time even with older children will not necessarily diminish to zero as 
they reach 18 years old and because some expenses . . . will not necessarily 
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be significantly or proportionately reduced the court concludes 
that it is reasonable to increase alimony to some extent as Kynda's income 
from child support payments goes down and as Kenneth's expenses from 
such payments also diminish." 
See R. at 57. The trial court therefore determined that, as each of the parties' children 
reaches the age of eighteen, the Mr. Richardson's alimony payments should increase by 
$100 per month. See id. 
On July 7, 2005, Mr. Richardson filed his Motion for Reconsideration with the trial 
court. See R. at 61. After full briefing by both sides, the trial court granted the Motion for 
Reconsideration in part, and denied it in part. See R. 103-117. The trial court did not alter 
its decision with respect to prospective alimony increases, and reasoned that the increases 
were not based on speculation, but rather, on circumstances foreseeable at the time of the 
divorce. See R. at 106-107 and 207. 
The trial court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and its Decree 
in this matter on May 19, 2006. See R. 213 and 234. The trial court awarded $1,374 per 
month in child support to Mrs. Richardson, with Mr. Richardson's child support 
obligations scheduled to terminate with respect to each child upon the child's eighteenth 
birthday or upon graduation from high school, if later. See R. at 235. The trial court 
ordered Mr. Richardson to pay alimony to Mrs. Richardson in the amount of $420 per 
month, with increases of $100 per month each time one of the four minor children reaches 
the age of 18. See R. at 228-29 and 239 (explaining, at 228-229 that "reasonable expenses 
associated for a time even with older children will not necessarily diminish to zero as they 
reach eighteen "). See R. at 229 and 240. 
At the time of the Decree, the ages of the parties' minor children were as follows: 
Dana, 19; Kyle, 17; Avery, 15; and Justin, 12. See R. at 234-35. The eighteenth birthdays 
of the parties' minor children are as follows: May 17, 2005 (Dana); July 19, 2006 (Kyle); 
August 21, 2008 (Avery); and March 25, 2011 (Justin). See R. at 214 (providing birth 
dates). Dana presumably graduated from high school on or about June 4, 2005. See R. at 
304 (transcript at 7). Kyle presumably graduated from high school in May, 2007. See R. 
At 304 (transcript at 8). No testimony was presented with regard to Dana's, Kyle's, 
Avery's or Justin's intentions to attend college, to remain at home, or to support 
themselves after their eighteenth birthdays or after high school graduation. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
If the decision of the Court of Appeals is allowed to stand, it will set the precedent 
that trial courts can force a parent to continue to financially support their adult children 
through an award which is coined "alimony", but is in fact simply a continuation of child 
support. Such precedent will allow a trial court to speculate as to the future positions of 
the parties, rather than entering an order based on the evidence before the court. 
Allowance of an alimony award such as that ordered by the trial court and affirmed by the 
Court of Appeals will have inconsistent and confusing tax implications. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Court of Appeals Erred By Affirming An Order That Required Mr. 
Richardson to Pay Increased Alimony as a Substitute for Non-
Mandatory Child Support for Adult Children 
The purpose of alimony is to provide support for the wife. See Medley v. Medley, 
93 P.3d 847 at 848, n.4 (Utah Ct. App. 2004) (relying on Georgedes v. Georgedes, 627 
P.2d 44, 46 (Utah 1981). An alimony award should enable the receiving spouse to 
maintain, as nearly as possible, the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage. Munns 
v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116, 121 (Utah Ct.App.1990). In determining alimony, a trial court 
must consider three factors: (1) the financial condition and needs of the receiving spouse, 
(2) the ability of the receiving spouse to produce sufficient income for him- or herself, and 
(3) the ability of the responding spouse to provide support. Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 
1369, 1372 (Utah 1988); Haumont v. Haurnont, 793 P.2d 421, 423 (Utah Ct.App.1990); 
Munns, 790 P.2d at 121. 
Any future changes in alimony are limited to instances where a material change of 
circumstances has occurred. See Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) 
(emphasis added). Howell also mandates that the "the standard of living existing at or 
near the time of trial" is the appropriate benchmark for determining an alimony award. 
See id. at 1212. 
In the case at bar, the trial court abused its discretion by awarding automatic, future 
increases in its alimony award in order to enable Mrs. Richardson to pay speculative 
expenses related to the parties' adult children. See R. at 228-229 (explaining that 
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"reasonable expenses associated for a time even with older children will not necessarily 
diminish to zero as they reach eighteen . . . ."). 
First, the automatic increases are not consonant with the goals of alimony. The trial 
court did not order automatic increases only to support Mrs. Richardson. Instead, such 
increases were awarded, at least in part, for expenses related to the parties' adult children. 
The automatic alimony increases are, in effect, disguised and non-mandatory child support 
payments. 
As a matter of law, the Richardsons have no obligation to provide support to able-
bodied, adult children. Under the Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act (hereinafter, 
"Support Act"), parents are not ordinarily obligated to provide any support to children over 
the age of eighteen. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-1 through 78-45-13. 
The Support Act does require parents to support their minor children. See Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 78-45-3 (father required to support child); 78-45-4 (mother required to 
support child). The Support Act defines a "child," however, as a son or daughter who is 
under the age of eighteen, unless the child is emancipated, married, or serving in the 
armed forces. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-2(6)(a). The Support Act makes exceptions 
for children who are over the age of eighteen, but still in high school during the normal, 
expected year of graduation. The Act also includes exceptions for disabled children and 
children who are otherwise unable to support themselves. See id. at subsection (b). 
At the time of the decree in this case (May 19, 2006), only one of the parties' 
children in question, Dana, had attained the age of eighteen. Dana was scheduled to 
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graduate from high school on or about June 4, 2006. See R. at 304 (transcript at 7, line 
23). No findings were made, however, regarding Dana's ability to support herself after 
graduation. Furthermore, no findings were made regarding the remaining three children's 
ability to support themselves in the future, and any such findings would have been purely 
speculative. As such, the trial court abused its discretion in mandating a $100 increases in 
alimony when each child attains the age of eighteen. 
Mrs. Richardson's justification for requesting alimony to compensate her for 
expenses related to adult children was that the parties' two oldest children, Olivia and Ed, 
had lived at home while attending college after they reached the age of eighteen, during 
which time the parties supported Olivia and Ed. See R. at 304 (transcript at 31-33). Mrs. 
Richardson admitted, however, that there was no verbal or written agreement with Mr. 
Richardson that the four younger children would be treated the same way. See id. 
(transcript at 67- 68 (beginning lines 23-25 of page 68; ending line 15 of page 68)). No 
testimony was presented regarding which of the four younger children had been accepted 
to college, intended to go to college, or intended to remain home after reaching age 
eighteen. 
As stated above, the payee spouse's standard of living existing at or near the time of 
trial is the appropriate benchmark for determining an alimony award. See Howell v. 
Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1212 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Nevertheless, the trial court awarded 
automatic increases in the alimony award each time one of the parties' children attains the 
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age of eighteen. The court stated that it did this because it realized that Mrs. Richardson 
was dependent on the child support to maintain her standard of living. The court said: 
While a significant amount of [Mrs. Richardson's] expenses can now be 
attributed to minor children in the home, a good part of the income needed 
by [Mrs. Richardson] to maintain the appropriate standard of living is also 
attributable to child support payments from [Mr. Richardson]. 
See R. at 229. This is an improper application of child support payments for two reasons. 
First, the Court made no findings to explain its determination that $100.00 was calculated 
to "maintain the appropriate standard of living." The $100.00 per child figure is an 
arbitrary number that the trial court simply assigned without any calculation to support 
such. Second, this Court has stated that "[c]ourt ordered child support is an obligation 
imposed for the benefit of the children, not the divorcing spouse." Race v. Race, 740 P.2d 
253, 256 (Utah, 1987). The premise that the child support helps maintain the lifestyle of 
Mrs. Richardson and therefore, alimony should increase when the child support decreases 
so that she can maintain the same standard of living is simply wrong. The child support is 
for the children, not Mrs. Richardson. The natural consequence of this ruling is that, as a 
matter of course, in all cases where there is an alimony and child support order, the court is 
at liberty to increase alimony as children come of age. Such a position has not been 
adopted by the courts in the past and should not be adopted at present. 
The child support payments are for the support of the children. When the legal 
obligation to make the payments ceases, the court should not order that they continue 
under another name. As the court observed in Grapin v. Grapin, 450 So. 2d 853 (Fla. 
1984), married parents may continue to support college-age children who remain at home, 
but such support "may be conditional and may be withdrawn at any time, and no one may 
bring an action to enforce continued payments. It would be fundamentally unfair for 
courts to enforce these moral obligations of support only against divorced parents while 
other parents may do as they choose." Grapin, 450 So. 2d at 854. 
Moreover, the automatic alimony increases awarded in this case are for an 
indefinite period of time. While it is true that parents often chose to continue supporting 
adult children for some years after they attain the age of eighteen, most parents are 
unwilling to do so indefinitely. As the award currently stands, Mr. Richardson has no 
ability to petition the court to stop the increased alimony payments, barring unforeseen 
circumstances. As long as Mrs. Richardson wishes to continue supporting adult children, 
Mr. Richardson is obligated to support them regardless of how old they are. In effect, 
Mrs. Richardson can hold him hostage to the decree, and she alone can decide when to 
terminate non-mandatory child support (inappropriately labeled "alimony" by the trial 
court). 
II. Under Utah Law, Automatic Changes in Alimony, Such As Ordered in 
This Case, Are Disfavored 
Under Utah law, alimony determinations must be based upon the payee spouse's 
needs either at the time of separation or at the time of trial. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-
5(8)(c). See also See Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209 at 1212 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Furthermore, "[t]he court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for alimony to 
address needs of the recipient that did not exist at the time the decree was entered, unless 
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the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify that action." See Utah Code Ann. § 
30-3-5(8)(g)(ii). 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that future changes in alimony are best left to 
"future determinations by the court under its continuing jurisdiction." See MacLean v. 
Maclean, 523 P.2d 862, at 863 (Utah 1974). Speculation about a party's future financial 
situation is not an appropriate basis for mandating automatic adjustments to an award of 
alimony. See Rasbandv. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331 at 1334 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (holding 
that automatic decreases in an alimony award, based upon trial court's vague and 
conclusory findings regarding wife's ability to earn future income, were improper). When 
no evidence is adduced in support of an order containing periodic changes to alimony 
payments, such periodic changes are an abuse of discretion. See Ridge v. Ridge, 542 P.2d 
189 at 191 (Utah 1975) (holding that periodic reductions in alimony and ultimate 
termination thereof was abuse of discretion because not based on the evidence at hearing, 
which only showed husband's income had gone down by an amount certain). 
In the context of petitions to modify, the Utah Court of Appeals has unequivocally 
stated that "any future changes in alimony are limited to instances where a material 
change of circumstances has occurred." See Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991) (emphasis added). Indeed, even a party's impending retirement is an 
insufficient basis for a petition to modify. See Nelson v. Nelson, 97 P.3d 722, 723-24 
(Utah Ct. App. 2004). 
In Nelson, the court explained that petitioner's motion to terminate alimony, based 
upon his scheduled, impending retirement and concomitant reduction in income, was not 
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ripe for decision because petitioner had not yet actually retired. According to the Nelson 
decision, changes in alimony are not appropriate until an '"imminent clash of legal rights 
and obligations'" has ripened. See Nelson, 97 P.3d at 723-24. 
In this case, the trial court abused its discretion and misinterpreted relevant law by 
requiring Mr. Richardson to pay larger alimony payments to Mrs. Richardson as each of 
their four minor children reaches the age of eighteen. See R. at 228-229 (explaining that 
"reasonable expenses associated for a time even with older children will not necessarily 
diminish to zero as they reach eighteen . . . . " ) . These prospective increases are based on 
speculation about Mrs. Richardson's potentially ongoing and, in all probability, non-
mandatory costs associated with children who may or may not need support after they turn 
eighteen. See R. at 304 (transcript at 31-33) (wherein Mrs. Richardson testified that 
because the parties' had previously supported their two eldest children while they lived at 
home and attended college, she expected that the same would apply to the four younger 
children). 
This case is analogous to Nelson, where the petitioner's retirement had not yet 
occurred, and thus his retirement could not affect his obligation to pay alimony. Similarly, 
in this case, three of the children had not reached the age of eighteen, and their future 
ability to support themselves was unknown. It is also unknown whether or not Dana or the 
other three children are or will be attending college or remaining in Mrs. Richardson's 
home. 
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Moreover, the parties have no obligation to support able-bodied children over the 
age of eighteen in the absence of a contractual obligation. See Part I of this Appellant's 
Brief, supra. Even if it is determined, in the future, that the parties have a statutory 
obligation to support any of their adult children (for example, in the event of disability), it 
would be a child support obligation and not a question of alimony. 
Essentially, the trial court has engaged in speculation about what voluntary 
expenditures the parties would make on behalf of their adult children in the future. That 
is not the purpose of either alimony or child support. Alimony is meant to enable the 
payee spouse to maintain her standard of living if she so chooses, or in the alternative, to 
equalize the income of the parties. Alimony is not meant to compensate the payee spouse 
for speculative, future expenditures on adult children that are wholly discretionary. The 
payor spouse could just as easily, and most likely will, choose to make discretionary 
expenditures on his adult children. If so, the payor spouse will also experience a potential 
reduction in his discretionary income and his ability to pay alimony. Both parties should 
be free to decide to what extent they wish to support able-bodied, adult children, free of 
court interference. 
Finally, to the extent that the alimony increases could be viewed as support for Mrs. 
Richardson's standard of living, such increases are based upon speculation about the 
future. It is unknown whether or not Mrs. Richardson's living expenses will remain 
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constant. She might, for example, move into a less expensive residence as the children 
move out. It is also unknown whether or not her earning capacity will increase. 
Similarly, it is unknown if Mr. Richardson's earning capacity will remain constant. 
His income could abruptly go down at or about the times of the court-ordered increases. 
Further, his expenses could increase for a variety of reasons. For example, one of the 
younger children could decide to live with him rather than with Mrs. Richardson. The trial 
court abused its discretion by making assumptions about the parties' future expenses and 
their ability to meet such expenses. 
The order of the trial court was based solely on speculation of the trial judge. The 
judge did not look at the facts as they were before him, but assumed that they would be a 
certain way in the future. Such speculation undercuts the purpose of Utah Code Ann. §30-
3-5(8)(g) which grants continuing jurisdiction so that the court may alter an alimony order 
after circumstances have changed, not before. 
III. The precedent Set By the Court of Appeals Causes Confusing and 
Inconsistent Tax Results. 
The decree entered by the trial court causes inconsistent tax treatment. Under the 
U.S. tax code "alimony" payments are deductible and "child support" payments are not. In 
this case the trial judge has created unsure tax consequences because he has created 
payments, which he calls "alimony", but which clearly fit under the tax code's definition 
of "child support". The payments are to support the adult children. 
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26 U.S.C.S. § 215(A) AND (B) and § 71(A)(B) AND (C)(2007), set forth the tax 
treatment of alimony and child support. § 215 allows a tax deduction for the paying 
spouse in the amount equal to alimony payments which are included in the gross income of 
the receiving spouse under §71. § 71 states that alimony is included in the in the gross 
income of the receiving spouse, but gross income shall not include "that part of any 
payment which the terms of the divorce or separation instrument fix (in terms of an 
amount of money or a part of the payment) as a sum which is payable for the support of 
the children of the payor spouse." 26 U.S.C.S. §71(c)(1). The trial clearly stated that the 
increase in alimony was in part to help support the adult children, or at the very least offset 
money that Mrs. Richardson was using to support the adult children. Pursuant to §71 the 
$100 increase per child in alimony would not be deductible by Mr. Richardson, nor would 
it be included in Mrs. Richardson's gross income because it is specifically earmarked for 
support of the children, even though the court calls it alimony. 
After all the children reach eighteen, the alimony payments will have increased by 
$4,800 per year. Two questions are raised: (1) how much of the $4,800, if any, is 
deductible while Mrs. Richardson is supporting the adult children, and (2) will it ever be 
proper to deduct the entire $4,800? At some point it is likely that Mrs. Richardson will 
cease supporting the children, but the additional alimony payments will continue. Do the 
parties include the $4,800 in Mrs. Richardson's income and allow Mr. Richardson the 
deduction at that time, or do they gradually include the money in her income as the 
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children become more and more self sufficient? How will Mr. Richardson know when 
Mrs. Richardson is no longer supporting the children so that he may take tlle tax 
deduction1* I hi IIMI rum! s ilmsion mil ^ (hr JHISVUT IOIIKM questions unclear 
because it improperly sets an "alimony" award to help support the children. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant Kenneth Richardson requests a rc\ t isal I I In 
Decree, insofar as it i i iai: iclates ii icreases in i alii i 101 ly as eacl i of tl le minor children reaches 
the age of eighteen.. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^L d*y of December, 2007. 
SCALLEY RLAD1NU BAFES 
HANSEN & RASMUSSEN, P.C. 
rTBruce Reading 
Jonathan H. Rupp 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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BILLINGS•; • Judge t 
Respondent Kenneth Andrew Richardson appeals the trial 
court's alimony award, arguing that the trial court erred when it 
ordered him to pay incremental increases in alimony to his ex-
wife, Petitioner Kynda Kay Richardson, upon the termination of 
child support. Mr. Richardson further asserts that the trial 
court erred when it awarded Ms. Richardson retroactive alimony, 
even though she failed to include a request for interim alimony 
in her petition for divorce. "We review a trial court's award of 
alimony for abuse of discretion. 'We will not disturb the trial 
court's alimony award so long as the trial court exercises its 
discretion within the standards set by the appellate courts,1'^ 
Bakanowski v. Bakanowski, 2003 UT App 357,17, 80 P.3d 153 
(citation omitted) (quoting Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 423 , 423 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990)). We affirm. 
First, Mr; Richardson contends that the trial court erred by 
ordering that, as each of the parties' children turns eighteen 
years old and the amount of child support decreases, the amount 
of alimony Mr..Richardson pays Ms. Richardson increases. 
Specifically, Mr. Richardson argues that it was improper for the 
trial court to mandate future changes to Ms. Richardson's alimony 
award based on a speculative change in her circumstances. 
believe, however, that Mr. Richardson mischaracterizes the 
considerations upon which the trial court based the increases in 
alimony. 
Under Utah law, fl[t]he trial court has broad latitude" in 
determining alimony awards. Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1074 
(Utah 1985). In making such awards, "the court shall consider 
all relevant facts and equitable principles and may, in its 
discretion, base alimony on the standard of living that existed 
at the time of trial." Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8) (c) (Supp. 
2006). Moreover, "[t]he court may, under appropriate 
circumstances, attempt to equalize the parties1 respective 
standards of living." Id. § 30-3-5 (8) (d) . As the supreme court 
stated, "the purpose of alimony . . . 'is to provide support for 
the wife as nearly as possible at the standard of living she 
enjoyed during marriage, and to prevent the wife from becoming a 
public charge.1" Jones, 700 P.2d at 1075 (quoting English v. 
English, 565 P.2d 409, 411 (Utah 1977)). 
Based on the underlying purpose of alimony, the supreme 
court "articulated three factors that must be considered in 
fixing a reasonable alimony award: ![1] the financial conditions 
and needs of the wife; [2] the ability of the wife to produce a 
sufficient income for herself; and [3] the ability of the husband 
to provide support.1" Id. (quoting English, 565 P.!2d at.411-12). 
After reviewing the record, we conclude that upon-Mr. 
Richardson's motion to reconsider, the trial court properly 
"analyzed the circumstances of the parties in light of these 
three factors." Id. 
It is clear that the trial court considered Ms. Richardson's 
financial needs as well as her ability to support herself. The 
trial court noted that 
[t]he parties were married for over twenty 
years and had six children. [Ms. Richardson] 
gave up her ability to acquire significant 
work skills and earning capacity to care for 
a large family, and continued to care for the 
remaining four minor children at the time of 
trial. She is in her forties or fifties and 
is not likely to significantly increase her 
earning capacity to a point where she can 
support herself at a standard the parties 
enjoyed during the marriage. 
This court has discussed the appropriateness of such alimony 
considerations "after a long-term marriage, where the wife 
(usually) has worked primarily in the home, has limited job 
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skills, and is in her late forties or fifties." Howell v. 
Howell, 8*06 P. 2d 1209, 1213 (Utah Ct. App. 1993 ).• 
The trial court determined that Ms. Richardson's initial 
alimony award of $420 per month was appropriate to address her 
needs, but only because that amount was "based on [Ms. 
Richardson's] present sources of income, including about $1375 in 
child support, which will decrease incrementally as each of the 
four minor children turns eighteen." Thus, as child support 
payments decrease, so does that source of Ms, Richardson's 
income. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court order 
incrementally increasing Ms. Richardson's alimony award properly 
considered her financial needs as well as her ability to support 
herself. 
The trial court also properly considered Mr. Richardson's 
"ability . . . to provide support." Jones, 700 P.2d at 1075. 
The trial court determined that while Mr. Richardson pays his 
child support obligations, the parties' respective incomes are 
equalized. However, as his child support obligations terminate 
over time,, his ability to pay support to Ms. Richardson increases 
while her ability to meet her own needs decreases. Without the 
addition of incremental increases in alimony payments to Ms. 
Richardson upon termination of child support, the parties' gross 
monthly incomes would be significantly disproportionate, and she 
would not be able- to enjoy the .standard of living she...enjoyed; 
during the marriage. 
After considering Mr. Richardson's ability to pay alimony 
once his child support obligations decrease, the trial court 
determined that upon the termination of his child support 
payments, Mr. Richardson has an increased ability to provide Ms. 
Richardson the support she needs to maintain the standard of 
living she enjoyed during the marriage. These incremental 
increases in alimony meet the goal of "better equaliz [ing] the 
parties' abilities to go forward with their respective lives" 
after their*long-term marriage, Howell, 806 P.2d at 1213, and 
provide Ms. Richardson with "the [approximate] standard of living 
she enjoyed during marriage," Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 
(Utah 1985) . Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in awarding Ms. Richardson incremental 
increases in alimony as her child support payments terminate. 
Second, Mr. Richardson argues that the trial court erred 
when it awarded Ms. Richardson retroactive alimony, even though 
she never petitioned the court for interim alimony during the 
divorce proceedings. Utah Code section 30-3-3 provides that the 
trial court "may order a party to provide money, during the 
pendency of the action, for the separate support and 'maintenance 
of the other party." Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3(3) (Supp. 2006), 
20060575-CA 3 
Section 30-3-3 further indicates that interim alimony may be 
ordered "prior to the entry of the final order or judgment [and] 
may be amended during the course of the action or in the final 
order or judgment." Id. § 30-3-3(4). This section allows a 
trial court to award interim alimony and does not specifically 
state that a party must request that the trial court order 
interim alimony prior to entry of the final order. See id. § 30-
3-3. 
Here, Ms. Richardson did not separately request interim 
alimony in her petition for divorce, but instead simply requested 
alimony. However, she testified at trial that she was seeking 
interim alimony. Section 30-3-5(1) gives the trial court power 
to include "equitable orders" in divorce decrees, id. § 3 0-3-
3(5), and the trial court has broad discretion in using this 
power. See Curry v. Curry, 7 Utah 2d 198, 321 P.2d 939, 942 
(Utah 1958) (recognizing that "the trial court is vested with 
broad equitable powers in divorce matters and that its judgment 
will not be disturbed lightly, nor at all unless the evidence 
clearly preponderates against [its] findings, or there has been a 
plain abuse of discretion, or a manifest injustice or inequity is 
wrought"). Therefore, we conclude that the trial court properly 
exercised its broad equitable powers in awarding retroactive 
alimony to Ms. Richardson. 
Accordingly/ we affirm. 
Billings, Judged Judith M.  
WE CONCUR: 
Pamela T. Greenwood, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
syne 
Carolyn B. McHugh, 
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DECREE OF DIVORCE 
The above-entitled matter came before the Honorable Stephen L. Roth of the above-
entitled Court on the 8th day of February, 2005. Petitioner appeared in person and was 
represented by her counsel, Joseph Lee Nemelka. Respondent appeared in person and was 
represented by his counsel, J. Bruce Reading. The Court, having heard argument of counsel and 
testimony of the parties and witnesses, having reviewed the file in this matter, having taken the 
matter under advisement, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, and having heretofore 
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and good cause appearing therefor, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREE AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Petitioner is awarded a divorce from Respondent based on the existence of 
irreconcilable differences that prevent the marriage from continuing. 
2. CHILD CUSTODY AND SUPPORT: There were six children born to this 
marriage, of whom four are still minors: Dana May Richardson, born May 17, 1987, Kyle Allen 
Richardson, born July 19, 1988, Avery Keen Richardson, born August 21, 1990, and Justin 
Wallace Richardson, born March 25, 1993. Petitioner is awarded sole physical and legal custody 
of the minor children. 
3. Respondent shall pay child support to Petitioner in the sum of $1,374 per month 
commencing as of the date of trial herein. 
4. Respondent's obligation to pay child support shall continue as to each minor child 
until that minor child reaches the age of eighteen (18) or graduates from high school, whichever 
later occurs. 
5. Pursuant to Utah Code §62A-11-401 et seq and -501, withholding of child support 
from Respondent's wages as a means of collecting child support shall be authorized. 
6. INCOME TAX EXEMPTIONS: Petitioner shall be awarded the minor children 
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Dana and Justin as dependants for tax exemption purposes and Respondent shall be awarded the 
minor children Kyle and Avery. When Dana reaches eighteen (18), the exemptions should 
alternate to equalize the benefits as much as possible, with Respondent having the deductions for 
two children and Petitioner for one the first year in which there are only three deductions 
available, Petitioner having two and Respondent one in the second year, and so on. When the 
deductions for children reduce to two, each parent may claim one deduction; when there is only 
one deduction left, that deduction goes to Petitioner. In the alternative, for any tax year the party 
for whom the exemption(s) is most valuable may elect to purchase the option(s) from the other 
party for the amount the other party would lost if the exemption were not available. The parties 
shall exchange tax information by March 1st of each year. In any event, Respondent's ability to 
claim any minor child(ren) is conditioned upon his being current in his child support and medical 
expense obligations. 
7. MEDICAL INSURANCE & EXPENSES: Each party shall provide medical 
insurance for the minor children as long as it remains available at a reasonable cost through his or 
her employment. If Respondent secures insurance, Respondent shall provide evidence of said 
coverage and that such coverage is effective in Utah. 
a. Each parent shall share equally the out-of-pocket costs of the premium 
actually paid by a parent for the children's portion of insurance. The children's portion of the 
premium is a per capita share of the premium actually paid. The premium expense for the children 
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shall be calculated by dividing the premium amount by the number of persons covered under the 
policy and multiplying the result by the number of children in the instant case 
b Each parent shall pay one-half QA) of all reasonable and necessary 
uninsured medical expenses, including deductibles and co-payments, incurred for the dependent 
children 
c The parent ordered to maintain insurance shall provide verification of 
coverage to the other parent, or to the Office of Recovery Services under Title IV of the Social 
Security Act, 42 U S C Section 601 et seq , upon initial enrollment of the dependent children, 
and thereafter on or before January 2 of each calendar year The parent shall notify the other 
parent, or the Office of Recovery Services of any change of insurance carrier, premium, or 
benefits within 30 calendar days of the date he/she knew or should have known of the change 
d The parent who incurs medical expenses shall provide written verification 
of the cost and payment of medical expenses to the other parent within thirty (30) days of 
payment 
e. In addition to any other sanctions provided by the Court, a parent 
incurring medical expenses may be denied the right to receive credit for the expenses or to 
recover the other parent's share of the expenses if that parent fails to comply with above 
8 PERSONAL PROPERTY: During the marriage the parties acquired certain 
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items of personal property including a savings account containing about $1,000.00, a certificate of 
deposit in the amount of approximately $6,000.00, a set of firearms collected by Respondent, 
tools, certain items of apparel made of animal fur, a Bobcat tractor, and three vehicles: a van in 
Petitioner's possession and two trucks (a 1981 Dodge Dakota and a 2003 Ford Ranger) in 
Respondent's possession. Petitioner shall be awarded the savings account, the certificate of 
deposit and the van and Respondent shall be awarded the two trucks, the tools, the firearm 
collection, the Bobcat tractor, and the fur items. 
9. There is also a New York Life Insurance Policy on Respondent's life with a 
$50,000.00 face amount and a cash value of about $6,300.00. It is in minor children's interest to 
keep the insurance policy in place, with Respondent to pay the premiums, having the minor 
children irrevocably designated as the beneficiaries and Petitioner as Trustee for the minor 
children. Once the last child is emancipated, the policy is to cashed in, with Petitioner to receive 
within sixty (60) days thereafter one-half Q/i) of the cash value of the policy, valued as of the time 
of trial. The parties have the option, if they both agree to do so, of cashing the policy in now, 
with the amount received in payment to be divided equally between them. 
10. Further, Respondent has a 401(k) that shall be divided equally and a Qualified 
Domestic Relations Order shall be prepared, if necessary. Any loans taken out by Respondent 
since the parties separation shall be added to the balance of the 401(k) prior to division. 
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Respondent shall provide a copy of his most recent statement showing the current balance and 
loan balance of the 401 (k). 
11. REAL PROPERTY: During the marriage the parties acquired two (2) parcels of 
real property: the marital home in Eagle River, Alaska, near Anchorage, and an unimproved, .92 
acre lot located in a subdivision in Willow, Alaska. Neither property is encumbered by a 
mortgage or other significant lien. Respondent shall be awarded the Willow lot, but shall pay to 
Petitioner the sum of $2,500.00 as her share of the Willow lot's value. 
12. The Eagle River residence shall be sold and the proceeds shall be split equally 
between the parties. However, if Respondent wants to keep the house, he must pay $30,000.00 
to Petitioner. 
13. ALIMONY: Petitioner is awarded the sum of $420.00 per month in alimony 
from Respondent. The alimony payment due to Petitioner shall increase by $100.00 per month, 
beginning the first day of the month after which each child turns eighteen (18). On this basis, 
when the last child turns eighteen (18), the alimony increases to Petitioner will amount to an 
additional $400.00 per month. 
14. Alimony shall continue for a period equal to the length of the marriage. Changes 
in income due to retirement at a reasonable age are not taken into account here and may be 
considered as changes of circumstances in the future, if otherwise appropriate. Alimony shall also 
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be paid retroactive to and including May, 2004. Said alimony obligation shall be automatically 
withheld by the Office of Recovery Services. 
15. PARENT-TIME: Respondent shall successfully complete a parenting class that is 
functionally equivalent to the multi-week parenting class provided by Valley Mental Health on 
court referral. Further, such course shall administered by an agency approved by the State of 
Alaska, such as the Men & Women's Center or the Recovery Connection. Once Respondent has 
done this, parent-time shall begin pursuant to §30-3-37 of the Utah Code. Respondent must 
complete the parenting course before the children are required to go to Alaska for parent-time. If 
Respondent travels to Utah in the interim, even without first having completed the class, and upon 
reasonable notice, he shall be allowed minimum parent-time pursuant to §30-3-35 of the Utah 
Code, or as the parties may agree. Respondent shall also be given liberal telephone access to the 
children at a minimum three (3) times per week, plus e-mail communication if available. The 
parties shall contact Valley Mental Health (Kathy Reimherr-556-6037) to determine the nature of 
its parenting class, and Respondent can complete that program or one in Alaska that is roughly 
equivalent (for example, a multi-week parenting class approved by the Alaska counterpart to 
Division of Child and Family Services). No later than thirty (30) days from December 23, 2005, 
Respondent's counsel shall provide Petitioner's counsel with a description of the class he intends 
to take. If the parties are in agreement that the proposed class meets the requirements of the 
court, Respondent shall complete the class as soon as reasonably possible. If the parties are in 
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disagreement, they shall approach the court for a resolution, but prepare to offer specific 
alternatives. As soon as Respondent has provided written verification that he has successfully 
completed the appropriate parenting class, his parent-time as set forth above can begin, including 
travel to Alaska. All applicable provisions of the advisory guidelines set forth in §303-33 of the 
Utah Code shall be adopted herein. 
16. Petitioner is ordered to pay the transportation costs of one (1) visit per year, 
provided that (a) there is not only one (1) visit, and (b) arrangements are made at least thirty (30) 
days in advance. If there is only one (1) visit per year, Petitioner shall be responsible for only one-
half (Vi) of the transportation costs for that visit. 
17. ATTORNEY'S FEES: Respondent shall be responsible to pay Petitioner's 
reasonable attorney's fees incurred in this matter in the sum of $4,488.00. 
18. NAME CHANGE: Petitioner shall be restored to her maiden name if desired 
DATED this p S l a v of / \Z^r( 2006. 
/£. ^HONORABLE S T E P H E N ^ ^ T ^ y 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KYNDA KAY RICHARDSON, ] 
Petitioner, ) 
vs. ] 
KENNETH ANDREW RICHARDSON, ] 
Respondent. ] 
) Case No. 034905249 DA 
) Judge Stephen L. Roth 
) Commissioner Susan Bradford 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The above-entitled matter came before the Honorable Stephen L. Roth of the above-
entitled Court on the 8th day of February, 2005. Petitioner appeared in person and was 
represented by her counsel, Joseph Lee Nemelka. Respondent appeared in person and was 
represented by his counsel, J. Bruce Reading. The Court, having heard argument of counsel and 
testimony of the parties and witnesses, having reviewed the file in this matter, having taken the 
#* . n 
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matter under advisement, and being otherwise folly advised in the premises, hereby finds as 
follows: 
1. JURISDICTION AND GROUNDS: As a threshold matter, the court notes that 
Petitioner has lived in Salt Lake County since January, 2003, after the separation of the parties in 
about mid-2002, and therefore concludes that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject 
matter of this case. Further, the parties have come to disagree deeply over crucial aspects of their 
life together, perhaps most importantly over the approach to raising and disciplining their children. 
While Respondent states that he does not desire a divorce, the parties had the benefit of 
counseling before the filing of the Petition, have been separated for over two (2) years and have 
established separate lives. The court concludes that there are grounds for entering a decree of 
divorce based on the existence of irreconcilable differences that prevent the marriage from 
continuing. 
2. CHILD CUSTODY AND SUPPORT: There were six children born to this 
marriage, of whom four are still minors: Dana May Richardson, born May 17, 1987, Kyle Allen 
Richardson, born July 19, 1988, Avery Keen Richardson, born August 21, 1990, and Justin 
Wallace Richardson, born March 25, 1993. The parties do not contest child custody and appear 
to be in agreement with Petitioner should have sole physical and legal custody. Petitioner was the 
primary caretaker for the children prior to the parties5 separation and the children continue to live 
with her at their present home in West Valley City, Utah, while Kenneth has remained in Alaska, 
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where the parties lived since their marriage in Anchorage on August 20, 1980. Petitioner appears 
to strongly desire custody, and she has been and continues to be a fit parent. There is no 
indication that the children have any different custody preference. The court concludes that 
Petitioner is and has been a fit and proper parent, that there is not reason to disturb the parties' 
own agreement with respect to custody. 
3. For purposes of the child support calculation, gross income includes income from 
almost any source, other than those specifically excluded by the statute. See U.C. A., Section 78-
45-7.7(1). At the time of trial Respondent was working full time for Aurora Electric in 
Anchorage as a project manager/estimator, earning a salary of $1,188.47 per week according to a 
January 28, 2005, Employer Earnings Statement showing about $61,800.00 per year. Apparently 
some time in 2003, after the parties' separation, Respondent was promoted to this supervisory 
position from the journeyman electrician position that he had formerly held at Aurora Electric. 
He received a lower salary in the prior position, but normally and consistently worked substantial 
overtime (more than 40 hours per week) during the marriage and thus earned about $5,000.00 
(2001 W-2) to $6,000.00 (2002 W-2) more each year than he does now, because as a supervisor, 
overtime is no longer available to him. Respondent testified that he took the promotion because it 
was a job change that he wanted and because his boss urged him to take the new position for the 
benefit of the company. While there is no indication other than timing that Respondent took the 
promotion in order to deliberately reduce his income for purposes of this proceeding, this was in 
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significant part a voluntary decision on his part that reduced his income. For this reason, the 
court believes that it is fair to consider his previous scrapping activities (in which he made up to 
$1,000 per year from time to time) as a source of income still open to him and to consider his 
historical overtime. In all, the court believes that it is reasonable to impute $1,700.00 per year a 
reasonable assessment of Kenneth's additional earning capacity for purposes of child support and 
alimony calculations, giving him some latitude to make changes in his work position to 
accommodate reasonable work-related goals, while recognizing that those changes are largely 
voluntary, as well as taking into account his ability to make additional income, as he has in the 
past, from scrapping or other work. 
4. In addition, Respondent receives an annual distribution made to all citizens of the 
State of Alaska. The most recent such distribution was $919, and Respondent testified that it was 
sometimes less and sometimes more. The court finds that a reasonable estimate of Respondent's 
income from state distributions is between $500 and $2,000, with the average bearing significantly 
toward the higher figure, or about $1,500. This annual payment falls within the broad scope of 
gross income under the statute, and the court concludes that the $1,500.00 figure is a reasonable 
estimate of ongoing income from this source for purposes of calculating gross income (for child 
support and alimony). Respondent's gross income for child support purposes is therefore 
$61,800.00 plus $1,700.00 plus $1,500; a total of $65,000 per year, or $5,417.00 per month. 
5. Petitioner is employed by the State of Utah, working full time. Her last pay stub 
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for 2004 showed her annual salary to be $21,927.00 or $1,827.00 per month. Petitioner's work 
experience is relatively minimal because of the parties' decisions regarding how their family would 
function during the marriage. After about a year of employment, Petitioner cared for the children 
at home during the marriage, with only short periods of part time employment, and she does not 
appear to have developed any specialized job skills. There was no evidence that she had either the 
opportunity or the capacity to earn more than what she is making now; and the court concludes 
that she is fully employed in her present position at the present rate of pay, which is her gross 
income. 
6. There is no evidence that either party was obligated to any other person for 
alimony or child support outside the bounds of this case, and therefore gross income and adjusted 
gross income are the same for each party. These figures are therefore to be used for calculating 
the share of child support attributable to each party, with Respondent to be the obligated party. 
7. Based upon the foregoing, Respondent shall pay child support to Petitioner in the 
sum of $1,374 per month commencing as of the date of trial herein. 
8. Respondent's obligation to pay child support shall continue as to each minor child 
until that minor child reaches the age of eighteen (18) or graduates from high school, whichever 
later occurs. 
9. Pursuant to Utah Code §62A-11-401 et seq and -501, withholding of child support 
from Respondent's wages as a means of collecting child support shall be authorized. 
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10. INCOME TAX EXEMPTIONS: The parties propose that they should each be 
allocated tax deductions for two children, but disagree on which. No real basis for allocation was 
presented other than the representation that Petitioner needed at least one child deduction as 
follows: Dana and Justin to Petitioner and Kyle and Avery to Respondent. When Dana reaches 
eighteen (18), the exemptions should alternate to equalize the benefits as much as possible, with 
Respondent having the deductions for two children and Petitioner for one the first year in which 
there are only three deductions available, Petitioner having two and Respondent one in the second 
year, and so on. When the deductions for children reduce to two, each parent may claim one 
deduction; when there is only one deduction left, that deduction goes to Petitioner. In the 
alternative, for any tax year the party for whom the exemption(s) is most valuable may elect to 
purchase the option(s) from the other party for the amount the other party would lost if the 
exemption were not available. 
11. MEDICAL INSURANCE & EXPENSES: Each party shall provide medical 
insurance for the minor children as long as it remains available at a reasonable cost through his or 
her employment. If Respondent secures insurance, Respondent shall provide evidence of said 
coverage and that such coverage is effective in Utah. 
a. Each parent shall share equally the out-of-pocket costs of the premium 
actually paid by a parent for the children's portion of insurance. The children's portion of the 
premium is a per capita share of the premium actually paid. The premium expense for the children 
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shall be calculated by dividing the premium amount by the number of persons covered under the 
policy and multiplying the result by the number of children in the instant case. 
b. Each parent shall pay one-half (14) of all reasonable and necessary 
uninsured medical expenses, including deductibles and co-payments, incurred for the dependent 
children. 
c. The parent ordered to maintain insurance shall provide verification of 
coverage to the other parent, or to the Office of Recovery Services under Title IV of the Social 
Security Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 601 et seq., upon initial enrollment of the dependent children, 
and thereafter on or before January 2 of each calendar year. The parent shall notify the other 
parent, or the Office of Recovery Services of any change of insurance carrier, premium, or 
benefits within 30 calendar days of the date he/she knew or should have known of the change. 
d. The parent who incurs medical expenses shall provide written verification 
of the cost and payment of medical expenses to the other parent within thirty (30) days of 
payment. 
e. In addition to any other sanctions provided by the Court, a parent 
incurring medical expenses may be denied the right to receive credit for the expenses or to 
recover the other parent's share of the expenses if that parent fails to comply with above. 
12. PERSONAL PROPERTY: The evidence at trial indicated disagreement over the 
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value and division of the certain personal property acquired during the marriage. This involved 
essentially a savings account containing about $1,000.00, a certificate of deposit in the amount of 
approximately $6,000.00, a set of firearms collected by Respondent, tools, certain items of 
apparel made of animal fur, a Bobcat tractor, and three vehicles: a van in Petitioner's possession 
and two trucks (a 1981 Dodge Dakota and a 2003 Ford Ranger) in Respondent's possession. 
The parties agreed at the end of the trial that Petitioner receive the savings account, the certificate 
of deposit and the van and that Respondent be awarded the two trucks, the tools, the firearm 
collection, the Bobcat tractor, and the fur items. The court has no reason to believe that this 
division is not fair and equitable and therefore concludes that it is. 
13. There is also a New York Life Insurance Policy on Respondent's life with a 
$50,000.00 face amount and a cash value of about $6,300.00. Respondent proposed that the 
policy be cashed out and the proceeds be share equally between the parties. It was not clear to 
the court what Petitioner wanted in this regard. It appears to the court that it would be of some 
value to the parties and in the children's interest to keep the insurance policy in place, with 
Respondent to pay the premiums, having the minor children irrevocably designated as the 
beneficiaries and Petitioner as Trustee for the minor children. Once the last child is emancipated, 
the policy is to cashed in, with Petitioner to receive within sixty (60) days thereafter one-half (Vi) 
of the cash value of the policy, valued as of the time of trial. The parties have the option, if they 
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both agree to do so, of cashing the policy in now, with the amount received in payment to be 
divided equally between them. 
14. Further, Respondent has a 401(k) that shall be divided equally and a Qualified 
Domestic Relations Order shall be prepared, if necessary. Any loans taken out by Respondent 
since the parties separation shall be added to the balance of the 401(k) prior to division. 
Respondent shall provide a copy of his most recent statement showing the current balance and 
loan balance of the 401(k). 
15. REAL PROPERTY: There are two (2) parcels of real property at issue, the 
marital home in Eagle River, Alaska, near Anchorage, and an unimproved, .92 acre lot located in 
a subdivision in Willow, Alaska. Neither property is encumbered by a mortgage or other 
significant lien. The parties agree that the equity of each property should be divided between 
them, but they disagree about the value of each property. Petitioner believed the Willow lot to be 
worth about $10,000.00, based on unspecified calls to real estate agents in the area. Respondent 
estimated the lot to be worth $3,000.00 to $4,000.00 and said that it had an assessment value on 
the tax notice of $4,200.00. The court believes that an estimated value of $5,000.00 is reasonable 
approximation of the value of the lot, given the sparse information presented. Petitioner is to 
receive $2,500.00 as her share of the Willow lot's value. 
16. The Eagle River home was purchased about twenty (20) years ago for about 
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$50,000.00. It was appraised in early 2004 at $60,000.00. Respondent says the appraisal is 
incorrect because it indicates that the house, a modular house, has sanitary sewer, asphalt street, 
curb and gutter, which it does not have. He believes it is worth $47,000.00 based on a tax 
assessment and on his estimate that it will take about $13,000.00 to connect the house to 
municipal sewer, a step he says is necessary to make the house saleable. Petitioner says she 
believes the appraisal is correct, even without a sewer hook-up, and that the house cannot have 
depreciated in value since it was purchased. The appraisal indicates that property values in the 
area are increasing, and no evidence was presented on how property tax assessments were made. 
Respondent has presented no reliable evidence of the effect on property value of the lack of sewer 
hook-up, much less that the value would be directly related to the cost of providing such an 
improvement. Nor has he presented any evidence of how property tax assessments are made in 
the area or how reliable an indication of actual value they are or that property values have 
decreased since the purchase of the property for $50,000.00 over twenty (20) years ago. The 
court believes that the appraisal is the most reliable indication of value under the circumstances 
and finds that the house is worth $60,000.00 at the time of trial and the equity should be divided 
equally, with the house to be sold and the net proceeds split equally between the parties. In the 
alternative, if Respondent wants to keep the house, he must pay $30,000.00 to Petitioner. 
17. ALIMONY: "[T]he purpose of alimony is to prevent the receiving spouse from 
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becoming a public charge and to maintain the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage to 
the extent possible." Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209 (Ut. Ct. App. 1991), citing Fletcher v 
Fletcher, 615 P.2nd 1218, 1223 (Utah 1980). The Supreme Court, in Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 
1072 (Utah 1985), set out "three factors that must be considered in fixing a reasonable alimony 
award: [1] the financial conditions and needs of the wife; [2] the ability of the wife to produce a 
sufficient income for herself; and [3] the ability of the husband to provide support." Id. At 1075 
(edits by the court; citations omitted); U.C.A., Sect. 30-3-5(8) (which expands the number of 
factors to be considered, while retaining the Jones factors as an essence of the inquiry.) After the 
determination of the needs and resources of both parties using the Jones factors, "the court should 
set alimony as permitted by those parameters, to approximate the parties' standard of living 
during the marriage as closely as possible." Howell, 806 P.2d at 1212. In the case of a long-term 
marriage, the alimony award "should, cto the extent possible, equalize the parties' respective 
standards of living and maintain them at a level as close as possible to the standard of living 
enjoyed during the marriage.'" Id, quoting Gardner v Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1081 (Utah 
1988) cf Howell, 806 P.2nd at 1216 n.4 ("The alimony award, however, need not be large 
enough to maintain the receiving spouse at the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage if 
that amount of alimony would lower the standard of living of the paying spouse below that of the 
receiving spouse."). Having considered "all relevant facts and equitable principles," the court 
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"may, in its discretion, base alimony on the standard of living that existed at the time of trial." 
U.C.A., Section 30-3-5(8)(c). 
18. Petitioner's income, as discussed above, is $1,827.00 per month. Accepting the 
annual deductions from her salary as set out in her 2004 year-end pay stub, they are Federal Tax 
($465.10), Social Security Tax ($1,286.53), Medicare Tax ($300.88), State Tax $551.73), and 
health, dental and vision insurance (together $1,176.52), for a total monthly deduction of about 
$315.00. Her net income for alimony purposes is therefore $1,512.00. (The court is not 
considering deductions for life insurance for either party because essentially voluntary (on the part 
of Petitioner) or building cash value from this point forward (on the part of Respondent)). Child 
support payments will be approximately $1,375.00 per month. Total net income, without 
consideration of alimony tax consequences, is therefore about $2,897.00. 
19. As to general expense deductions, the court believes that Petitioner's monthly 
expenses, as set forth in Exhibit 7, are reasonable, especially considering that she is caring for four 
(4) children. Neither party presented much evidence of their standard of living at the time of 
separation, so the court is relying primarily on evidence regarding their expenses as a fair 
substitute or approximation. While she filed a financial declaration earlier that stated lower 
expenses, the court found credible her explanation that she had been keeping expenses 
deliberately low during that period because of the financial uncertainties of the unresolved divorce 
and had increased her expenses to a more normal level during 2004, the subject period for Exhibit 
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7. Those deductions are supported by detailed monthly expense reports. Nevertheless, Exhibit 7 
contains more expenses that the court considers as either one-time costs or not allowable for 
purposes of alimony determination. Those include attorneys fees and mediation costs related to 
the divorce in the amount of $1,331.00. They also include $1,779.00 in what appears to be a one-
time cost for the purchase of appliances ($906.10 to Maytag on January 26 and $873.05 to 
Maytag on February 7), although the court believes that one-half that amount (about ($890.00) is 
a reasonable annual budget for general maintenance of a home and its contents over a the long 
term, given the number of children in her care and the need to furnish a separate house, and ought 
to be included as an expense. Because the testimony indicated that the parties historically have 
made donations to their church at about ten percent (10%) of income and continue to do so, each 
listing such donations as part of their expenses, the court considers these donations as a 
continuing part of their previous and present standard of living and will include them as 
reasonable expenses for both parties. Deducting $185.00 per month for one-time expenses, 
Petitioner's reasonable expenses are $3,306.00 per month. The deficit between her income, 
including initial child support, and her reasonable expenses is therefore about $409.00 per month. 
20. Respondent's income, as discussed above, is $5,417.00 per month. This amounts 
to salary of $61,800.00 per year, plus $1,500.00 state payment and $1,700.00 additional 
attributed income, per the analysis set forth above. Deductions, per Respondent's weekly Direct 
Deposit Earnings Statement, including Medicaid $16.94), Social Security ($72.45), Federal Tax 
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$117.85), local tax $5.40) and health insurance $10.25). The court is not considering deductions 
for 401k contributions, a medical flex plan and a 401k loan repayment. The loan payment 
deduction (amounting to about $193.00 per month) is to pay off a $10,000.00 loan Respondent 
took out of his retirement plan in 2003, after the separation, to pay attorneys fees $5,000.00, a 
down payment on a new truck ($3,000.00), and a deposit in a savings account $2,000.00). The 
court does not believe the repayment on this loan, given its timing and the use of the proceeds, 
ought to be counted as a deduction from salary for alimony purposes. Other deductions appear 
reasonable. Similarly, the medical flex plan is a voluntary contribution (about $10.00 per week) 
that can be used to pay medical expenses as they arise (apparently deductibles and other expenses 
not covered by insurance). Because this is essentially a medical savings plan for the benefit of the 
Respondent, it should not be counted as a true deduction for alimony purposes. 
21. The total weekly deductions from salary are therefore about $223.00 or about 
$966.00 per month. Including an additional $26.00 per month to account for a proportional 
amount of deductions for the imputed $1,700.00 per year (there was no evidence that the state 
payment of $1,982.00 per year was taxed), the total deductions are about $992.00 per month, 
leaving a net income, before any alimony tax benefits of $4,465.00. There was no evidence of the 
effect of alimony payments on Respondent's tax liability or alimony receipt on Petitioner's, but 
the court does not believe that tax considerations related to alimony would substantially alter the 
conclusions reached herein. 
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22. Some expenses the court believes should not be included. As discussed above, the 
court does not believe that the expenses for repayment of the 401k loan (about $193.00 per 
month) and life insurance (which the court estimates at $65.00 per moth based on the absence of 
any other evidence other than Respondent's claim to have $165.00 in monthly expenses for all 
insurance other than deducted health insurance premiums) should be included for purposes of 
alimony determination, as they are not necessities, and neither party urged their inclusion. In 
addition, Respondent claims a total of $350.00 per month in medical and dental expenses. There 
was no evidence of a need for health care that would support expenses at that level, especially 
since he apparently has employer-provided health insurance for which amounts are deducted from 
his salary; and absent any evidence of particular health conditions requiring treatment, the court 
believes that $50.00 per month is reasonable. Respondent's reasonable expenses are therefore 
about $3,628.00. 
23. Respondent therefore has a surplus of net income over expenses of about $837.00 
per month. The court notes that, while both the parties and the court have used figures for 
income and expenses that appear quite specific, these figures in reality are approximations, 
especially as they are meant to ultimately represent amounts received and spent in the future. In 
determining alimony, the court recognizes and takes into account the imprecision of the amounts 
involved. 
24. Other than the equity in the marital home, the parties have accumulated little in the 
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way of resources to supplement their incomes. Considering Petitioner's financial condition and 
needs and her inability to provide sufficient income to meet those needs, together with 
Respondent's ability to provide support and the significant income differential between them even 
taking into account the payment and receipt of child support, the court concludes that Respondent 
shall pay alimony to Petitioner. In addition, the court believes it is significant that this is a long 
term marriage in which Petitioner gave up her ability to improve her skills and earning capacity to 
care for a large family, so that should play a part in the determination of alimony amounts, as well. 
See Howell, 806 P.2d at 1213. The court believes that alimony in the amount of $420.00 is a fair 
and reasonable award. This sum approximates the Petitioner's need, before consideration of the 
alimony tax consequences, and falls within Respondent's capacity to pay, as determined by the 
court. 
25. While a significant amount of her expenses can now be attributed to minor children 
in the home, a good part of the income needed by Petitioner to maintain the appropriate standard 
of living is also attributable to child support payments from Respondent. As children reach the 
age of eighteen (18), which will be a regular occurrence over the next few years, the court 
believes that Petitioner's income will be reduced disproportionately to the reduction of expenses 
both because the reasonable expenses associated for a time even with older children will not 
necessarily diminish to zero as they reach eighteen (18) years old and because expenses, such as 
mortgage, utilities and so on will not necessarily be significantly or proportionately reduce even 
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when children do leave the home. For that reason, the court concludes that it is reasonable to 
increase alimony to some extent as Petitioner's income from child support payments goes down 
and as Respondent's expenses from such payments also diminish. This also contributes to the 
goal of maintaining a rough equivalence in the parties' standard of living after a long-term 
marriage. Id. (considering the effects of diminishing child support obligations as children reach 
eighteen (18) on the relative disparity of income between spouses). The alimony payments due to 
Petitioner should therefore increase by $100.00 per month, beginning the first day of the month 
after which each child turns eighteen (18). On this basis, when the last child turns eighteen (18), 
Respondent's income will have increase by about $1,375.00 per month, while commensurate 
alimony increases to Petitioner will amount to $400.00 per month, leaving him with some cushion 
that takes into account the purported increased costs of living in Alaska and not reducing his 
standard of living below Petitioner's. 
26. Alimony should continue for a period equal to the length of the marriage. Changes 
in income due to retirement at a reasonable age are not taken into account here and may be 
considered as changes of circumstances in the future, if otherwise appropriate. Alimony should be 
paid retroactive to and including May, 2004. 
27. PARENT-TIME: While it is apparent that Respondent loves his children, during 
the marriage he took a decidedly harsher approach to their discipline than did Petitioner, going to 
the extreme of punishing them by the use of a belt on occasion and threatening to do so more 
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regularly. The court believes that this goes beyond acceptable limits on discipline of children and 
it apparently played a part in the break up of the marriage. The children remain somewhat 
intimidated by their father, and their distance from him, both emotional and geographical at this 
point, has been exacerbated by his decision that it would be best under the circumstances of the 
separation to contact them infrequently. While his telephone contacts have recently increased, he 
has seen the children only a few times since the separation. Some or all of the children have been 
in counseling to deal in part with issues involving their father. 
28. It is in the best interest of the children to reestablish their relationship with their 
father as soon as possible and that his access to them be as liberal as the distances involved allow, 
at a minimum in accordance with the applicable guidelines for parent time. Under the 
circumstances, Respondent shall successfully complete a parenting class that is functionally 
equivalent to the multi-week parenting class provided by Valley Mental Health on court referral. 
Further, such course shall administered by an agency approved by the State of Alaska, such as the 
Men & Women's Center or the Recovery Connection. Once Respondent has done this, parent-
time should begin pursuant to §30-3-37 of the Utah Code. The court's primary concern is that 
Respondent complete the parenting course before the children are required to go to Alaska for 
parent-time. If Respondent travels to Utah in the interim, even without first having completed the 
class, and upon reasonable notice, he should be allowed minimum parent-time pursuant to §30-3-
35 of the Utah Code or as the parties may agree. Respondent should also be given liberal 
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telephone access to the children at a minimum three (3) times per week, plus e-mail 
communication if available. The parties should contact Valley Mental Health (Kathy Reimherr-
556-6037) to determine the nature of its parenting class, and Respondent can complete that 
program or one in Alaska that is roughly equivalent (for example, a multi-week parenting class 
approved by the Alaska counterpart to Division of Child and Family Services). No later than 
thirty (30) days from December 23, 2005, Respondent's counsel shall provide Petitioner's counsel 
with a description of the class he intends to take. If the parties are in agreement that the proposed 
class meets the requirements of the court, Respondent should complete the class as soon as 
reasonably possible. If the parties are in disagreement, they should approach the court for a 
resolution, but prepare to offer specific alternatives. As soon as Respondent has provided written 
verification that he has successfully completed the appropriate parenting class, his parent-time as 
set forth above can begin, including travel to Alaska. All applicable provisions of the advisory 
guidelines set forth in §303-33 of the Utah Code shall be adopted herein. 
29. Petitioner is ordered to pay the transportation costs of one (1) visit per year, 
provided that (a) there is not only one (1) visit, and (b) arrangements are made at least thirty (30) 
days in advance. If there is only one (1) visit per year, Petitioner shall be responsible for only one-
half Q/i) of the transportation costs for that visit. 
30. ATTORNEY'S FEES: Based on the Court's assessment that Petitioner's 
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expenses are beyond her income and other resources at this point and on its conclusions that 
Respondent's resources provide him with a surplus over his expenses (as discussed in connection 
with alimony, above), the court concludes that Respondent should be responsible to pay 
Petitioner's reasonable attorney's fees incurred in this matter. Petitioner has insufficient income 
to meet her needs, and alimony payments will bring her income up to the point where her needs 
are met, not including attorney's fees. Respondent will have a level of surplus and is more able to 
pay fees. Petitioner should provide evidence of the amount and reasonableness of the fees she 
claims to the Court. 
31. NAME CHANGE: Petitioner shall be restored to her maiden name if desired. 
From the foregoing findings of facts, the Court now makes and enters its 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That the bonds of matrimony hereto and now existing between Petitioner and 
Respondent shall be dissolved and Petitioner shall be granted decree of divorce from Respondent, 
the same to become absolute and final upon the signing of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and the Decree of Divorce and the filing of the same with the Clerk of the above-entitled Court. 
2. That all matters and issues including, but not limited to, child custody, parent-time, 
child support, alimony, division of property and debts, and attorney fees shall be ordered pursuant 
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to the foregoing Findings of Fact. 
DATED this iV^day of Vi< _, 2006. 
BY THE COURT: 
/• '-i r: 
1
 /THIRD DISTlSfejCb'^^ft^Ey 
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